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Digital Image Watermarking: A Formal Model,
Fundamental Properties, and Possible Attacks
Hussain Nyeem1*, Wageeh Boles1 and Colin Boyd1,2
Abstract
While formal definitions and security proofs are well established in some fields like cryptography and
steganography, they are not as evident in digital watermarking research. A systematic development of
watermarking schemes is desirable, but at present their development is usually informal, ad hoc, and omits the
complete realization of application scenarios. This practice not only hinders the choice and use of a suitable
scheme for a watermarking application, but also leads to debate about the state-of-the-art for different
watermarking applications.
With a view to the systematic development of watermarking schemes, we present a formal generic model for
digital image watermarking. Considering possible inputs, outputs, and component functions, the initial
construction of a basic watermarking model is developed further to incorporate the use of keys. On the basis of
our proposed model, fundamental watermarking properties are defined and their importance exemplified for
different image applications. We also define a set of possible attacks using our model showing different winning
scenarios depending on the adversary capabilities. It is envisaged that with a proper consideration of
watermarking properties and adversary actions in different image applications, use of the proposed model
would allow a unified treatment of all practically meaningful variants of watermarking schemes.
Keywords: digital watermarking; data protection; image watermarking; watermarking model
1 Introduction
Digital watermarking—a data hiding technology—has
already justified its suitability for different multime-
dia applications. Watermarking generally operates on
different digital media or cover objects (e.g ., image,
audio, video) and is considered to have three major
components [1, 2]: watermark generation, embedding,
and detection. Watermark generation yields the de-
sired watermark, which can optionally depend on some
keys. The generated watermark is embedded into the
cover object by the watermark embedding, sometimes
based on an embedding key. During detection, the em-
bedded watermark in a cover object is extracted and
verified. The basic realization of watermarking may be
valid for other multimedia applications; however, we
restrict our attention in this paper only to the digital
image applications.
An image watermarking application may have differ-
ent objectives, which determine the necessary water-
marking properties for that application. Those objec-
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tives can be classified into two types: (i) security objec-
tives (i.e., to achieve certain security properties such
as integrity of the watermarked image) and (ii) non-
security objectives (e.g ., annotation for an efficient
image-database management). Achieving these objec-
tives requires determining and considering the neces-
sary properties of the individual watermarking com-
ponents. The watermark generation and embedding
properties generally include visibility, blindness, em-
bedding capacity, and perceptual similarity. Similarly,
blindness, robustness, error probability, etc. are stud-
ied for watermark detection. (We formally define these
properties later in Sec. 4. Until then, inverted commas
are used to refer to them for their abstract meaning.)
A general consideration of these properties, however,
is more than difficult for the diverse requirements of
the applications. Consequently, without a proper con-
sideration of the properties and the application scenar-
ios, various watermarking schemes are being developed
and evaluated.
Proper consideration of watermarking properties and
application scenarios, on the other hand, is highly crit-
ical for the development and use of a watermarking
scheme. A loose consideration of the properties may af-
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fect the overall watermarking performance. Similarly,
an improper realization of an application scenario may
leave security vulnerabilities. For example, if the de-
velopment (i.e., design and evaluation) of a scheme is
motivated by the high embedding capacity and high
perceptual similarity requirements (and thus ignores
the other properties), the scheme may eventually re-
quire high embedding time. On the other hand, in an
image content authentication application, if the sce-
nario is not considered properly (e.g ., a watermark
is generated without considering the required proper-
ties such as “collision resistance” property), the sch-
eme can have security flaws and may not be reliable
in practice [3]. Therefore, a systematic development of
watermarking schemes is essential.
A systematic development means to have mathemat-
ical formalism and operation determination for water-
marking schemes. Here, operation determination helps
identify the objectives and properties of a watermark-
ing scheme with their explicit consideration for an ap-
plication scenario, and mathematical formalism is used
to specify them. An informal study of watermarking is
easier to grasp first, but its formal study is desirable
since formalism has several benefits: (i) the potential
to provide rigorous analysis of the required watermark-
ing properties, (ii) the completeness for resolving am-
biguities and misconceptions, and (iii) the readiness
for supporting a computer aided fashion of analysis.
However, the present development of watermarking
schemes is rather informal, ad hoc, and usually omits
the realization of the application scenarios as men-
tioned above. This practice not only hinders water-
marking applications from choosing a suitable scheme,
but also leads to debate about the state-of-the-art for
different watermarking applications. Addressing this
problem requires a complete generic model with well
defined properties of digital watermarking as a basis
for its formal study. Since watermarking may also need
to achieve various security properties (along with any
non-security objectives), the expected adversary capa-
bilities must also be considered.
In support of a systematic development (i.e., design
and evaluation) of the watermarking schemes, in this
paper, we aim at developing a formal generic model
of digital image watermarking. A generic and formally
defined watermarking model gives the big picture of
watermarking and helps identify all of its possible vari-
ants for different (image, video, etc.) applications. In
other words, by determining the required (watermark-
ing) inputs, outputs, and properties for different ob-
jectives, this model helps characterize a watermarking
scheme. Using the proposed model, we seek to define
a set of watermarking properties based on the appli-
cation requirements. The proposed model also helps
thorough analysis of watermarking schemes. An in-
complete model here may lead to an inadequate com-
putational analysis of a scheme resulting in various
technical flaws and protocol weaknesses, which can be
exploited later by an adversary. To this end, we also
study a set of possible attacks to show the winning
conditions for an adversary in different scenarios.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the relevant literature addressing the need for a formal
generic watermarking model. Section 3 presents the
construction of a formal generic watermarking model.
In Section 4, the systematic definition of necessary
properties are given with examples to demonstrate
their technical use in digital image applications. Sec-
tion 5 explains different security aspects of the model
providing with the common attack models. The con-
clusions are given in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The construction of an appropriate general model is
a fundamental need for watermarking as discussed in
previous section. However, only a few relevant research
covers the adjoining fields of steganography and data-
hiding [1, 4–15]. In this section, we briefly review differ-
ent models proposed for watermarking (or its adjoin-
ing fields) and thoroughly consider a set of selected
criteria to study them. Considering objectives, inputs-
outputs, component functions, and underlying theory,
we briefly overview those models below. We also sum-
marize our findings in Tables 1 and 2.
Jian and Koch [5] presented a model for the ab-
straction of digital watermarking schemes. From the
steganography and spread spectrum communication
concepts, that model provides a common basis for per-
formance evaluation of some earlier schemes. However,
the inputs and outputs are incomplete for a general wa-
termarking scenario. For example, a watermark is not
clearly defined and considered as an identification code
using bit-noise—the bit-stream of noise-like signals.
Therefore, analysing various security issues (e.g ., vec-
tor quantization attacks [16] arising from an input im-
age independent watermark generation), and abstrac-
tion of new schemes (which are not spread-spectrum
communication based) may require a further develop-
ment of that model.
Petitcolas et al . [4] illustrated a digital watermark
embedding and recovery model from an information
hiding viewpoint. To give an overview of the technique,
a simplified data-hiding scenario is considered and thus
any formal definition of the inputs, outputs, and com-
ponent functions are omitted. The model, therefore,
remains limited to describe a watermarking scheme in
a more complete sense. For example, how the water-
marking key and/or the mark (which represents either
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Table 1 Summary of the models used in relevant studies.
Models
in Use
Objectives Inputs &
Outputs
Component
Functions
Underlying
Theory
Limitations
Jian and
Koch et
al . [5]
To describe digital
watermarking
schemes
Original data
Watermarked data
Degraded data (as
a copy of
watermarked
data)
Identification code
(as watermark)
Embedding
(bit-carrier selector,
bit-noise generator,
bit-carrier modifier)
Extraction
(bit-carrier selector,
bit-pattern
matching)
Steganography
Spread-
spectrum
communi-
cations
Signal
processing
Limited consideration of the
inputs, outputs,
component-functions, and
watermarking properties for
image applications
Limited to spread-spectrum
communication based
watermarking schemes
O’Sullivan
et al . [8]
To determine the
optimal hiding
strategy, where
watermarking is
considered as a
game between an
attacker and
information hider
Input and output
data (e.g .,
images, audio,
etc. as a vector)
Message (as
watermark)
Encoder
Decoder
Information
theory
Steganography
Limited consideration of the
image application scenarios,
inputs, outputs,
component-functions, and
watermarking properties
Cox et al .
[11]
To examine the
similarities
between
watermarking and
traditional
communication
models
Cover-data (as a
vector)
Watermark message
Watermarked
cover-data
Perceptual distance
function
Encoding function
Extraction function
Mixing function
Spread-
spectrum
communi-
cations
Limited consideration of image
application scenarios (e.g .,
that use only spread
spectrum based schemes),
inputs, outputs, component
functions, and watermarking
properties
Petitcolas
et al . [4]
To illustrate a
simplified case of
watermarking
concept
Mark (as
fingerpring or
watermark)
Stego-image
Marked-image
Embedding
Recovery
Information
hiding
Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
components
May not be useful to study
image watermarking schemes
rigorously
Cohen
and
Lapidoth
et al . [9]
To compute the
coding capacity of
the watermarking
game for a
Gaussian cover
text and squared
mean error
distortions
Cover-text
Message
Stego-text
Secret key
Encoder
Decoder
Game theory
Information
theory
Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
components
Watermarking is considered as
a game in a copyright
application scenario
Adelsbach
et al . [12]
To analyse security
of watermarking
schemes against
protocol attacks
(e.g ., copy,
ambiguity
attacks)
Unwatermarked
object
Watermarked
object
Watermark
Key
Key generation
Embedding
Detection
Cryptography Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
components
Application scenarios are
limited to dispute resolving
protocols
Barni et
al . [13]
To provide a
general security
framework for
robust watermark
Original content
Watermark
Watermarked
content
Key (for embedding
and detection)
Embedding (feature
extraction and
mixing, watermark
generation)
Decoding
Information
theory
Cryptography
Signal
processing
The concept of fair and unfair
attacks may not be realistic
Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
components (e.g ., what
original content includes)
Li et al .
[1]
To illustrate the
formulation of the
security
definitions and the
attacker models
Original and
watermarked work
(as a vector)
Watermark (as bit
sequence)
Watermark
generation
Watermark
embedding
Watermark detector
Perceptual distance
function
Data-hiding
Cryptography
Signal
processing
Limited consideration of inputs
and outputs
The model is represents only a
simplified case of
watermarking
Continued on next page
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Table 2 Summary of the models used in relevant studies. (Continued from previous page.)
Models in
Use
Objectives Inputs &
Outputs
Component
Functions
Underlying
Theory
Limitations
Moulin et al .
[15]
To evaluate hiding
capacity in an
optimal attack
context (as a
data-hiding game)
Host-data (image,
audio, video,
etc.)
Message
Side information
Composite data
(contains hidden
message)
Encoder
Decoder
Information
theory
Data-hiding
Game theory
Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
component functions (e.g .,
inputs and outputs are not
conventional for
watermarking)
Mittelholzer [6] To characterize
embedding process
and attacked
stego-image (for
analysing secrecy and
robustness in terms
of mutual
information)
Cover-data
Key
Secret message
Stego-encoder
Stego-channel
Stego-decoder
Information
theory
Steganography
Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
component functions
More related to
steganography schemes
Cachin [10] To quantify
steganographic
security
Cover-text
Stego-text
Secret key
Key generation
Embedding
Extraction
Information
theory
Steganography
Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
component functions
More related to
steganography schemes
Limited to the passive attack
scenarios
Adelsbach et
al . [7]
To formalize
robustness considered
as a core security
property, of
watermarking
Cover-data
Stego-data
Watermark
Key (for
embedding and
detection)
Secret parameter
(used as key-
generation input)
Key generation
Embedding
Detection
Cryptography Limited consideration of
inputs, outputs, and
component functions
Limited to robust
watermarking schemes
a fingerprint—hidden serial number, or a watermark—
hidden copyright message) is chosen/generated needs
to be explicitly defined.
In order to analyse watermarking as a classical com-
munication system for digital multimedia data, Cox et
al . [11] presented a generic communication model of
watermarking. In that model, individual vectors gener-
alize cover-data and distortion. Distortion is assumed
to be additive, and a real valued function is consid-
ered to measure perceptual distance between content
vectors. That model is suitable to describe an opti-
mal embedding scheme that embeds a watermark with
its largest possible size (in bits) to offer the highest
possible detection ability. There may be some variants
of such an embedding scheme (depending upon differ-
ent watermarking properties like “blindness”, “robust-
ness” etc.). that can also be described using that model
(by defining the functions in different ways). However,
that model may not help to define and analyse an im-
age watermarking scheme completely, because of its
limited consideration of the inputs, outputs, and/or
use of keys, in some application scenarios (e.g ., au-
thentication, tampering detection and recovery, etc.).
Mittelholzer [6] demonstrated a theoretical model to
define a case of the embedding process and malicious
modification, of a stego-message. The embedding pro-
cess considers hiding a secret stego-message (as water-
mark), and thus mainly aims at achieving confiden-
tiality and robustness properties in terms of mutual
information. That model provides a theoretical basis
for designing some watermarking schemes, for exam-
ple, where the cover images have statistically Gaussian
components. The model, however, may not be able to
address many other watermarking properties due to
limited considerations of the inputs, outputs and com-
ponent functions. For example, the “blindness” prop-
erty that helps determine the requirements of other in-
puts (different from the input image and watermark),
which are not considered in the model.
Following a thorough security analysis, Li et al . [1]
referred to a general watermarking model. Unlike
many other models, that model considers the basic
component functions more completely using the signal
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processing paradigm. It also allows a more structured
approach to define various threat models. However, the
model still has limited specifications of the inputs and
outputs of its components. For example, a watermark-
ing scheme may have other inputs (in addition to the
input image and other multimedia signal referred to
as work) to generate the watermark, which are not
present in the model. As a result, it represents only a
simplified case of watermarking and may not help re-
alize the overall scenarios completely for the security
or other watermarking requirements.
Barni et al . [13] presented a watermarking model
to generally tackle the security analysis using an at-
tack classification inspired by cryptographic models.
Their model includes two main functions: watermark
embedding and decoding. The embedding function has
three steps: feature extraction from the original con-
tent; watermark generation from the message using a
key; and feature mixing with the watermark. The de-
coding function decodes the hidden message from wa-
termarked version using a decoding key. This realiza-
tion indeed presents a basic watermarking application
scenario. However, a more complete set of inputs and
outputs, and the separation of functions (for example,
separating watermark generation from embedding, and
message decoding from watermark detection) may help
describe a watermarking scheme with more insights for
a broader application scenario. Besides, although mod-
elling the watermark as a game is compelling for the
security analysis, the concept of fair and unfair attacks
may not be realistic.
Watermarking has also been studied [8, 9, 14, 15]
using the formal concepts of game theory and infor-
mation theory. O’Sullivan et al . [8] suggested water-
marking can be defined as a game played between an
information hider and an adversary. The attacker and
information hider scenarios are further studied for wa-
termarking [9, 14]. Later, Moulin and O’Sullivan [15]
formalized a distortion function, watermarking code,
and attack channel. The main limitation of the mod-
els used to demonstrate the game scenarios in those
studies is that they only represent a set of cases of
watermarking. Such an approach of defining a model
can help address particular problems for an applica-
tion, but may not be able to represent the overall wa-
termarking scenario (which is required to develop a
unified watermarking theory). In other studies [7, 12],
watermarking models are used as an abstraction of se-
curity proofs.
The different models, discussed so far, are mainly es-
tablished for different digital media and to individually
describe and analyse different watermarking schemes.
In other words, those models are not general in the
sense that neither of them would be sufficient to study
most of the digital image watermarking schemes avail-
able in the literature. Some of them are influenced by
the underlying concept of steganography [5, 6, 8, 10],
cryptography [1, 7, 12, 13], information theory [6, 8–
10, 15], or spread spectrum communication [11]. In
many cases [4–7, 12, 13], a key is used but their re-
spective properties are not clearly defined, especially
in achieving a specific security property. Watermark
generation and its general inputs-outputs are not con-
sidered in most of them [4–7, 12]. A few researchers [5–
7, 11] define necessary properties for their model, while
others do not. All the above mentioned models are
mainly motivated by the “robust” watermarking sce-
narios (e.g ., copyright protection), where unauthorized
removal is of core interest. Moreover, the models stud-
ied so far are mostly incomplete to be a generic model
in terms of: (i) considering the inputs, outputs, and
basic components, (ii) defining necessary properties,
and/or (iii) realizing the application scenarios. We
therefore conclude that despite having a basic need
for it, a formal generic image watermarking model is
still lacking.
In our earlier work [2], we introduced a formal
generic watermarking model for image applications ad-
dressing a gap in watermarking literature. We explored
the need for the watermarking model and showed some
uses of the model to define a few watermarking proper-
ties and attacks. In another follow-up work [3], we have
also presented the use of the model in describing and
analysing security of specific watermarking schemes,
where we have shown how these schemes are violating
the systematic definition of security. This paper, how-
ever, aims at incorporating further clarification and
improvements on the constructions and definitions of
the model and its uses. We consider here a relatively
complete set of fundamental properties and wide range
of application scenarios for digital images. With the
aid of some practical examples, we also show the uses
of the properties addressing a few hidden assumptions
in current practice. Further, the set of expected adver-
saries are reconsidered to show how they can win with
a particular attack. In the following sections, the main
contributions are presented in three parts: (i) a formal
watermarking model (Sec. 3), (ii) definitions and uses
of fundamental properties (Sec. 4), and (iii) possible
attacks on the watermarking security (Sec. 5).
3 A Formal Generic Watermarking Model
A formal generic watermarking model is of great im-
portance. It is one of the most fundamental require-
ments for conceptualizing, systematic development
and evaluation of the watermarking schemes, as dis-
cussed in Sec. 1. It helps avoid any confusion and mis-
conceptions by defining the necessary inputs, outputs,
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and component functions of a watermarking scheme.
The watermarking schemes described using a formal
model offer the readiness for implementation and com-
puter aided fashion of analysis. The required proper-
ties and design criteria of a watermarking application
can also be defined by the model, which helps charac-
terize a watermarking scheme for the application. The
model also provides a means for defining attack models
and thus for carrying out a rigorous analysis of a wa-
termarking scheme. Moreover, a formal watermarking
model creates a common platform for all possible wa-
termarking schemes. Such a platform is expected not
only to give a designer sufficient flexibility to describe
any watermarking scheme, but also to help others un-
derstand the scheme in a systematic way.
In this section, we present a construction of a formal
generic watermarking model in two stages, namely the
basic model and the key-based model. The challenge
here is to consider a “complete” set of watermarking
inputs, outputs, and component functions in general
from their specific information domains and function
families. However, the problem can be reduced to a
watermarking application(s), where a set of “possible”
inputs, outputs and component functions can be de-
fined in general to capture the fundamental proper-
ties of prominent schemes proposed today for the ap-
plication(s). We therefore narrow down our scope to
only the watermarking applications in digital images,
and start constructing a basic model with considering
the possible watermarking inputs, outputs, component
functions used in the applications. Later, a key-based
model is developed by incorporating keys to the basic
model for completeness. This would allow a designer
to achieve any required security properties (e.g ., au-
thentication, confidentiality) and to employ any suit-
able cryptographic technique as a building block in a
watermarking scheme.
3.1 Construction of a Basic Model
A basic model, as it implies, is expected to represent
a basic scenario for the image watermarking applica-
tions. We firstly identify the fundamental components
and their possible inputs and outputs of a watermark-
ing scheme. Irrespective of the system and security
requirements, a watermarking scheme can have three
fundamental components as mentioned in Sec. 1 and
shown in Fig. 1. In order for their systematic defini-
tion, we consider three functions: watermark genera-
tion, G (·), embedding, E (·), and detection, D (·), and
define their possible inputs and outputs as shown in
Table 3. The primary roles of these functions in an im-
age watermarking application are described below. To
denote different data (e.g ., inputs and outputs) within
this context, in what follows, plain-letters indicate the
Watermark 
Image-data 
Watermarked 
image 
 
Watermark 
Embedding 
Watermarked 
image-data 
Estimated 
image-data  
Watermark  
Image-data 
Estimated message 
and/or other image-data  
Watermark 
Detection 
Message 
Image-data Watermark  
Watermark 
Generation 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Other image-data 
Figure 1 Fundamental components of (digital) image
watermarking: (a) watermark generation, (b) watermark
embedding, and (c) watermark detection.
original versions, and respective single-bar letters and
tilde-letters indicate their watermarked and estimated
versions accordingly.
Watermark generation, G (·). This function gen-
erates a suitable watermark according to the wa-
termarking objectives in an application. In a sim-
ple data-hiding application, a watermark can be
the embedding-data (e.g ., message, m, other image-
data, j) itself (along with any side information). In
an advanced application, a watermark may require
to have certain properties (depending upon the wa-
termarking objectives). For example, in a copyright
protection application, a watermark may need to be
“robust” against certain processing techniques and/or
attacks. (We will discuss the “robustness” property in
detail in Section 4.5.) Failure to consider those prop-
erties may result in technical flaws and security vul-
nerabilities. Although watermark generation is mainly
constrained by the required properties, it starts with
necessary inputs and their properties. For an image
application, the generation function, G (·), can take
image-data, i, and message, m and/or other image
data, j as input, and outputs a watermark, w.
Watermark embedding, E (·). As the data-hiding
component, watermark embedding function considers
where and how to embed the watermark satisfying var-
ious requirements of the cover objects (here, digital im-
ages). For example, a “perceptual similarity” require-
ments (that control which pixels can be modified to
what extent) of medical images may limit the embed-
ding region [17]. (We will discuss the “perceptual simi-
larity” property in detail in Sec. 4.1.) There are differ-
ent domains (e.g ., spatial, transform) for embedding,
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Table 3 Components of a basic watermarking model.
Components Inputs Outputs
Watermark
generation,
G (·)
image-data, i
message, m
other image-
data, (j : j 6= i)
watermark, w
Watermark
embed-
ding, E (·)
image-data, i
watermark, w
watermarked image data, i¯
Watermark
detec-
tion, D (·)
watermarked
image-data, i¯
image-data, i
watermark, w

estimated image-data, i˜
estimated message, m˜
estimated other
image-data, j˜
or, failure, ⊥
which are computed directly from an input image. Em-
bedding types may also be different (e.g ., invisible, in-
vertible or reversible, blind, etc.—will be discussed in
Sec. 4). Irrespective of the embedding region, domain
and type, however, an embedding function E (·) can
take a watermark, w and the original image-data, i as
input to output the watermarked image-data, i¯.
Watermark detection D (·). This function helps make
an objective decision (e.g ., to declare whether the con-
tent is authentic) and/or initiate further actions (e.g .,
to extract the embedded data, to engage and retain
users of the watermarked objects). In different appli-
cation scenarios, the additional tasks may vary and de-
pend on the binary decision (i.e., pass or fail). The ba-
sic idea is that D (·) extracts the embedded watermark
and regenerates another version of the watermark,
from the inputs. If the regenerated version matches
the extracted version, a pass signal is returned. (The
pass signal is considered to pass the parameters such
as the valid watermark, the estimated image-data, etc.
to its dependent module that performs the additional
tasks, which will be shown later in Fig. 3.) Other-
wise a failure is output. The main constraints for this
function thus can be the minimum error probabilities
(e.g ., false negative/positive rates) and computation
time. Like the functions, G (·) and E (·), the internal
design of D (·) can also vary, but it generally takes
watermarked image-data, i¯, original image-data, i and
a watermark, w to yield either an estimated image-
data, i˜, message m˜ and other image-data, j˜, or a fail-
ure, ⊥.
Thus, a basic watermarking scheme for digital im-
ages can be defined as a 6-tuple (I,M,W, G,E,D) such
that:
(i) I, the image-data space, is a set of tuples with
value in the positive integers Z+ = {|a| ≥ 0 :
a ∈ Z}. Each tuple is a set of coordinates,
(x, y) for 2D-space, or (x, y, z) for 3D-space with
x, y, z ∈ Z+. An element of image data space is
called an image of a × b size for 2D-space, and
of a × b × c for 3D-space, where a, b, c ∈ Z+
and x = {1, 2, 3 · · · a}, y = {1, 2, 3 · · · b}, and
z = {1, 2, 3 · · · c}. I,J ,I¯, and I˜ are the subsets of
I, where:
• I is the set of original unwatermarked image-
data;
• J is the set of other image-data used for
watermark generation and J ∩ I = φ;
• I¯ is the set of watermarked image-data;
• I˜ is the set of estimated original image-data;
• J˜ is the set of estimated other image-data.
(ii) M is the plaintext space, and W = {0, 1}+ is the
watermark space. A message is a string of plain-
text symbols. M ⊂ M is the set of original mes-
sages, and W ⊂ W is the set of original water-
marks. M˜ ⊂ M and W˜ ⊂ W are the sets of re-
spective estimates.
(iii) G is a function G : I ×M × J → W that is used
for watermark generation.
(iv) E is a function E : I ×W → I¯ that is used for
watermark embedding.
(v) D is a function D : I¯ × I ×W → I˜ × M˜ × J˜ ∪
{⊥} that is used for watermark detection, where
⊥ indicates a failure.
(vi) a watermark w is valid if and only if it is ob-
tained from valid inputs, (i,m, j) using the valid
watermark generation function, G (·) such that,
G(i,m, j) = w. Similarly, a watermarked im-
age, i¯ ∈ I¯ is valid if and only if E(i, w) =
i¯ for valid inputs, (i, w) ∈ I × W . More for-
mally, we can define a digital image watermark-
ing scheme to be complete, if the following is
true: for all (i,m, j) ∈ I × M × J there ex-
ists
(˜
i, m˜, j˜
) ∈ I˜ × M˜ × J˜ , where i˜ ≈ i, j˜ ≈
j, such that D (E (i, G (i,m, j)) , i, G (i,m, j)) =(˜
i, m˜, j˜
)
. Here, the symbol ‘≈’ denotes the per-
ceptual similarity between two images. For exam-
ple, i˜ ≈ i implies that the perceptual content of i
and i˜ are “sufficiently” similar to each other. (For
more complete definition of perceptual similarity
property, see Def. 4.1.)
It is worth noting here that we consider the origi-
nal (unwatermarked) version of an image as the input
image for the watermarking functions. In most cases,
original images are used for watermarking. However,
there may be cases where a (valid) watermarked ver-
sion of an image can be used as an input image. For
example, to update/re-embed a watermark in an ex-
isting watermarked image, one may need to use the
present (or any earlier) watermarked version, rather
than using the original image. It depends upon the
application scenario which version of images are to be
used (and how any restrictions on using them should
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Figure 2 Deploying keys in the detection function of our basic
model.
be dealt with). However, this variation (in input im-
age versions) can be studied as a special case of the
proposed model, where the model may accept either
an original image or its existing watermarked versions
as an input. Therefore, we consider the fundamental
scenario for the proposed model, where an (original)
image is watermarked for the first time.
The construction of the above basic model is suit-
able for realizing a basic watermarking scenario, but
it may not be sufficient to capture the recent water-
marking advances. Although study of a complete wa-
termarking model is still lacking, many advances are
evident [18–22] in the present watermarking context.
For example, the concepts of using keys and deploying
cryptographic techniques are prominent in addressing
different levels of security in various application sce-
narios such as content/owner authentication and copy-
control. Such developments help obtain the combined
benefits from the fusion of data-hiding and crypto-
graphic techniques.
3.2 Towards a Complete Watermarking Model
To adopt and generalize the use of keys, we extend
the basic scenario to a key-based scenario. We assume
two individual keys, generation key, g and embedding
key, e for G (·) and E (·), respectively. Although in our
basic construction, for simplicity, D (·) is considered to
perform the detection and extraction tasks inherently,
this should naturally be split into separate functions
for security reasons. We, therefore, separate the com-
putation of extraction from D (·) using an additional
function X (·), which we call the extraction function.
Thus, an individual detection key, d and extraction
key, x can be used as shown in Fig. 2. These two
functions, D (·) and X (·) can be further defined as
sub-functions of watermark decoding (to resemble our
earlier construction) as shown in Table 4. The other
two functions, G (·) and E (·) can similarly be the sub-
functions of watermark encoding. Fig. 3 illustrates the
watermark encoding and decoding processes.
We note here that the outputs
(˜
i, w˜
)
of D (·) and(
m˜, j˜
)
of X (·) can be an exact estimate of their orig-
inal versions respectively for a non-blind decoder (see
Table 4 Components of a key-based watermarking model.
Components Inputs Outputs
Key gen-
eration,
Key (·)
image-data, i
message, m
other image-
data, (j : j 6= i)
generation key, g
embedding key, e
detection key, d
extraction key, x
Watermark
encod-
ing
Generation,
G (·)
generation key, g
image-data, i
message, m
other image-
data, (j : j 6= i)
watermark, w
Embedding,
E (·)
embedding-key, e
image-data, i
watermark, w
watermarked
image-data, i¯
Watermark
decod-
ing
Detection,
D (·)
detection-key, d
watermarked
image-data, i¯
image-data, i
watermark, w

estimated
image-data, i˜
estimated
watermark, w˜
or, failure, ⊥
Extraction,
X (·)
extraction key, x
watermarked
image-data, w¯
image-data, i
estimated
watermark, w˜

estimated
message, m˜
estimated other
image-data, j˜
or, failure, ⊥
Def. 4.3 for “blindness” property). Here, exact esti-
mates of (m, j) are obtainable at X (·) from an exact
estimate of w as D (·) outputs. For a blind decoder,
to get an exact estimate of the input image, original
information (that is compromised for embedding) is
required by D (·). This requirement leads to the con-
struction of E (·) as an invertible (or reversible) func-
tion, a major recent watermarking trend. (We discuss
the “invertibility” or “reversibility” property later in
Sec. 4.4.) Further, how exactly i˜, w˜, m˜ and j˜ can be
produced depends on how much error is allowed in
their estimation — an error in estimating w˜ at D (·)
propagates through to yielding m˜ and j˜ at X (·). How-
ever, w˜ and m˜ are defined as bit strings, and for any
decoder (blind or non-blind), they should be an ex-
act estimate except for a few bit errors that can be
handled by error correction codes.
Further, as shown in Fig. 3(b), the detection func-
tion in the watermark decoding invokes the extraction
function, once the detection is completed. We note here
that the detection function is executed independently,
and may only output a pass or fail signal depending
upon the existence of a valid watermark. This also
means that, the extraction is not always required (de-
pending upon the applications such as image content
authentication). However, the extraction function can
be performed after the detection, when required for
the applications like image annotation, since extrac-
tion of the information carried by the watermark will
Nyeem et al . Page 9 of 21
Watermark  
Embedding (E) 
Message (m) 
Other image-
data (j) 
Image-data (i) 
Embedding Key (e) 
Generation Key (g) 
Watermark (w) 
 
Watermarked 
image (𝑖 ) 
 
Watermark 
Generation (G) 
(a) 
Water-
mark  
Extrac-
tion (X) 
Watermark  
Detection 
(D) 
Watermarked 
image-data (𝑖  ) 
Watermark (w) 
Image-data (i) 
Extraction Key (x) 
Detection Key (d) 
Failure (⊥) 
 
Estimated Other 
image- data (𝑗 ) 
 
Estimated 
Message (𝑚 ) 
 
Estimated 
image-data (𝑖 ) 
⊥ 
 𝑖    
i 
𝑤  
 
(b) 
Figure 3 Key-based digital watermarking model:
(a) watermark encoding, and (b) watermark decoding.
make sense, only if the image is passed by the detec-
tion (e.g ., ensuring the authenticity or integrity of the
watermarked image).
We, therefore, develop the construction of a basic wa-
termarking model (for digital images) further to incor-
porate the use of keys. We define here a key-based wa-
termarking scheme as a 8-tuple (I,M,W,K,G,E,D,X)
such that:
(i) I,J ,I¯,I˜, and J˜ are subsets of I. Definition for the
image-data space, I, the plain text space, M, the
watermark space, W, and their respective sub-
sets are the same as defined in the basic model
of Sec.3.1.
(ii) K is the set of all keys and a key is a sequence
of m binary bits, where m ∈ Z+. Sets of water-
mark generation keys, Kg, embedding keys, Ke,
extraction keys, Kx, and decoding keys, Kd are
subsets of K (i.e., Kg ⊂ K, Ke ⊂ K, Kx ⊂ K,
and Kd ⊂ K).
(iii) G = {Gg|g ∈ Kg} is a family of functions Gg :
I ×M × J → W that is used for watermark gen-
eration.
(iv) E = {Ee|e ∈ Ke} is a family of functions Ee :
I×W → I¯ that is used for watermark embedding.
(v) D = {Dd|d ∈ Kd} is a family of functions Dd :
I¯×I×W → I˜×W˜∪{⊥} that is used for watermark
detection.
(vi) X = {Xx|x ∈ Kx} is a family of functionsXx : I¯×
I× W˜ → M˜ × J˜ ∪{⊥} that is used for watermark
extraction.
(vii) For each key, g ∈ Kg and e ∈ Ke there exists d ∈
Kd and x ∈ Kx respectively i.e., for all (i,m, j) ∈
I × M × J , there exists (˜i, w˜) ∈ I˜ × W˜ |˜i ≈ i
such that Dd (Ee (i, Gg (i,m, j)) , i, Gg (i,m, j)) =(˜
i, w˜
)
, and for all w˜ ∈ W˜ , there exists (m˜, j˜) ∈
M˜×J˜ |J˜ ≈ j such thatXx (Ee (i, Gg (i,m, j)) , i, w˜)
=
(
m˜, j˜
)
.
At this point, we stress the properties of the keys
that can differentiate between private and public wa-
termarking schemes. We define a watermarking sch-
eme as a private key (or simply private or symmetric)
scheme if d = e, and x = g (i.e., if d and x can at
least be easily computed from e and g, respectively).
Otherwise, we call it a public key (or simply public
or asymmetric) scheme if d 6= e and x 6= g, and if
computing d and x from e and g is “computationally
infeasible” in practice respectively. The phrase “com-
putationally infeasible” follows the standard definition
in cryptography. Here, d and x are the private keys and
e and g are the public keys. Similar to the watermark-
ing keys, watermarking itself has many properties that
may lead to its many practically meaningful variants
for different applications. Before discussing these prop-
erties and defining them in Sec. 4, we present below a
comparative study in support of our above model.
3.3 A Comparative Study
In comparison with the summary of existing models
(Table 1 and Table 2), we summarize the features of
our proposed model in Table 5. As discussed in Sec. 2,
a common limitation is the narrow focus on a par-
ticular type of data-hiding, steganography or water-
marking scenario with different objectives, in devel-
oping a watermarking model. This leads to consider-
ing a simplified set of inputs, outputs, and component
functions. Although such a simplified and generalized
model helps realize the application scenarios of some
relevant schemes, in the formal watermarking context,
they are incomplete and thus need to be re-defined to
be used as a general model for image applications.
Our model addresses the major limitations of rele-
vant models for studying image watermarking schemes.
We believe that the proposed model is a first step to-
wards a formalized conception of image watermarking,
and allows a unified treatment of all its practically
meaningful variants. Considering this, we also define a
set of fundamental properties in following sections us-
ing our model to further strengthen the watermarking
theory in the image application context.
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Table 5 Summary of the proposed model.
Model in
Use
Objectives Inputs &
outputs
Component
functions
Underlying
theory
Limitations
Proposed To provide a means for
the systematic
development, and
thus to develop a
unified and more
realistic theory, of
digital image
watermarking
Image-data (with
different
properties, e.g .,
original,
watermarked,
etc., see Fig. 3)
Watermark
Message
Key (for each
function)
Key generation
Watermark
generation
Watermark
embedding
Watermark
detection
Watermark
extraction
Digital image
and signal
processing
Cryptography
May not be suitable for
studying steganography
schemes
4 Fundamental Watermarking Properties
Defining the properties of watermarking plays an im-
portant role in the systematic development of various
schemes. For example, in developing a new scheme, the
watermarking objectives determine a set of criteria (as
discussed in Sec. 1). Each criterion can be expressed
in terms of the minimum requirements for a relevant
watermarking property. In the design phase, those re-
quirements help characterize the scheme (e.g ., by set-
ting constraints for the construction of watermarking
functions). In the evaluation phase, measuring (with
a suite of tests) how those requirements are fulfilled
gives merit to the scheme. The relative importance of
each property, thus, can be determined based on the
application requirements. This also means that the in-
terpretation and significance of watermarking proper-
ties can vary with the application. These properties,
in practice, can be interpreted in terms of the inputs
and outputs of watermarking components, use of keys,
etc. They can also be mutually dependent, which re-
quires a trade-off among the improvements in the prop-
erties [23] for an application.
In the image watermarking context, a number of
defining properties (considering their relative impor-
tance) are studied below: perceptual similarity, visibil-
ity, blindness, invertibility, robustness, embedding ca-
pacity, error probabilities, and security. In the follow-
ing sections, we formally define these properties using
the developed watermarking model (Sec. 3) and show
how they can be interpreted and used in a real appli-
cation scenario. To simplify reading, from now on, the
notations are used without explicitly giving their do-
mains. For example, ‘for all a, b, c, · · · ’ will be used to
mean ‘for all (a, b, c, · · · ) ∈ A×B × C · · · ’.
4.1 Perceptual Similarity
The perceptual similarity (or imperceptibility) is one of
the most important properties for the image applica-
tions. Since embedding distortion is inevitable, E (·)
exploits the (relatively) redundant information of an
image intelligently for a minimum of visual artefacts.
In almost any image application, therefore, keeping a
watermarked image perceptually similar to the origi-
nal image becomes an important criterion. Perceptual
similarity means the perceptual contents of the two
images are “sufficiently” similar to each other, (and
thus it is mainly studied for the invisible watermarking
schemes; the “visibility” property is discussed below).
The requirements for this property may vary with the
application scenario. In order to ease the problem of
dealing with these varying requirements, we now define
the perceptual similarity property using a quantitative
approach.
Definition 4.1 (Perceptual Similarity). Any two im-
ages, i1 and i2, are said to be (d, t) perceptually
similar, if dj (i1, i2) ≤ tj for all similarity measures
dj ∈ d ≡ {d1, d2, · · · , dn} and thresholds tj ∈ t ≡
{t1, t2, · · · , tn}.
Various measures are used to quantify the require-
ments for the perceptual similarity. For example, corre-
lation quality (CQ), signal to noise ratio (SNR), peak
or weighted SNR (PSNR or WPSNR), mean square er-
ror (MSE), structural similarity index (SSIM), mean or
weighted SSIM (MSSIM or WSSIM), normalized cross-
correlation (NCC), etc. However, no globally agreed
and effective measures for visual quality currently ex-
ist [24]. In addition, not all the measures give the simi-
lar estimation. Therefore, we define perceptual similar-
ity by defining a similarity measure, which is a set of
n-suitable measures that help quantify the perceptual
distance between two images. Now, we define two im-
ages to be perceptually similar (or imperceptible) for
an acceptable value returned by all suitable measures
defined for similarity.
As an example to use the above definition, we may
consider two measures (i.e., n = 2): PSNR and
MSSIM, for the similarity measure, d such that d1 =
PSNR and d2 = MSSIM. The given thresholds are:
t1 = 60 (dB) and t2 = 0.995. Two images i1 and i2 are
said to be perceptually similar if both d1 (i1, i2) ≥ 60
and d2 (i1, i2) ≥ 0.995 are satisfied.
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4.2 Visibility
A visible watermarking scheme deliberately inserts a
watermark such that it appears noticeably on the wa-
termarked image to show some necessary information
such as company logo, icon, or courtesy. However, in
order that the watermark does not become so strongly
pronounced that it takes over the main image, the level
of visibility can be controlled, for example, by a param-
eter α. Visible watermarks are important in recogni-
tion and support of possessing a digital image. In con-
trast, an invisible watermark is embedded by keeping
the perceptual content of the watermarked images sim-
ilar to that of the original images to address security
problems in different application scenarios. Therefore,
there are schemes which are either visible or invisible
based on the appearance of watermark on the water-
marked images.
Definition 4.2 (Visibility). A watermarking scheme
is called visible or perceptible, if E (·) embeds a given
watermark, w, into an image, i, such that the w ap-
pears at least noticeably in i¯. That is, |Ee (i, w)− i| =
αw for all i, w. Here, α is weight factor that controls
the degree of visibility.
A watermarking scheme is called invisible or imper-
ceptible, if E (·) embeds w into i such that the i¯ is
perceptually similar to the original image, i. That is
Ee (i, w) ≈ i for all i, w.
Although the visibility and perceptual similarity
properties share some perceptual aspects of a water-
marked image, they need not to be confused with each
other. As stated in Def. 4.1, the perceptual similar-
ity property determines if an original image and its
watermarked version remain “perceptually” the same.
On the other hand, Def. 4.2 states that a visible water-
mark appears on a watermarked image with a prede-
fined degree of visibility, α, and thus strictly speaking
for the visible watermarking, the watermarked image is
not perceptually similar to the original image. Percep-
tual similarity property is thus studied for the invisible
watermarking schemes.
An invisible watermarking scheme usually differs
from a visible watermarking scheme, not only in the
visibility factor, but also in their embedding processes.
Invisible embedding of a watermark aims at keeping
the perceptual difference (resulting from the embed-
ding distortion) at a “minimum” level such that the
watermarked and original images remain perceptu-
ally the same. Their perceptual similarity is verified
by quantifying the perceptual difference using similar-
ity measures. The commonly used similarity measures
do not indicate any subjective quality degradation,
rather they quantify the overall perceptual difference
either by their local (e.g ., block-wise or kernel-based)
or global (e.g ., whole image based) operations. As a
result, the defined perceptual similarity does not di-
rectly indicate whether a watermarking scheme is visi-
ble or invisible. However, for an invisible watermarking
scheme, the quantified perceptual difference between
an original image and its watermarked version would
naturally be much lower than that for a visible water-
marking scheme.
In short, an invisible scheme may be considered a
variant of visible watermarking with a “negligible”
(i.e., approaching zero) α, and having an additional
(and even more strict) perceptual similarity require-
ment. Visible watermarking is present in a few appli-
cations such as video broadcasting. However, recent
research is mainly focussed on invisible watermarking
with a high perceptual similarity in various image ap-
plications [25–41].
4.3 Blindness
Another important watermarking property is blindness
that helps characterize a scheme to be blind, non-blind,
or semi-blind. The term blindness (or oblivious) is gen-
erally used in cryptography to define a detection pro-
cess independent of any side information. More specifi-
cally, blindness is used to define a computational prop-
erty of information retrieval (e.g ., to define the com-
putational independence on the original information
or its derivatives to retrieve the required information).
Similarly, blindness defines the detection and extrac-
tion process in digital watermarking, although there is
no complete definition for a watermarking scheme to
be blind or non-blind.
As a requirement for blindness, some schemes con-
sider that no original input image and the informa-
tion derived from the input image should be required,
whereas other schemes consider only avoiding the orig-
inal input requirement during the detection. Although
schemes in both categories are often considered as
blind, with a more strict blindness requirement, the
schemes in the latter category may eventually fail to
achieve the overall design requirements in an image
application (e.g ., image authentication). Additionally,
confusion arises when a scheme is defined as semi-
blind. Sometimes, it is considered that if the detection
and extraction processes can operate objectively with-
out the original image and its derived information, but
still require the original watermark, then the scheme
can be semi-blind.
Cox et al . [42] informally defined a blind or oblivi-
ous watermark detector in such a way that the detector
does not require access to the original (i.e., unwater-
marked) image, or some information derived from the
original image. Otherwise, the detector is called non-
blind or informed. However, their definition is not suf-
ficient to realize three different cases associated with
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the blindness property. We define here (Def. 4.3) wa-
termarking blindness to distinguish the dependency of
D (·) and X (·) on any of the original input data that is
used in G (·) and E (·), and thereby distinguish three
different cases of this watermarking property.
Definition 4.3 (Blindness). A watermarking scheme
is called blind (or oblivious) if both D (·) and X (·) are
independent of the original image, i and watermark, w.
Formally, for all images i1, i2 and watermarks w1, w2,
hold both
Dd (¯i, i1, w1) = Dd (¯i, i2, w2)
and Xx (¯i, i1, w˜) = Xx (¯i, i2, w˜) .
A watermarking scheme is called semi-blind if ei-
ther one of D (·) and X (·) is independent of i and/or
w. Thus, for semi-blind watermarking, for all images
i1, i2 and watermarks w1, w2 either
Dd (¯i, i1, w1) = Dd (¯i, i2, w2)
and Xx (¯i, i, w˜) 6= Xx (¯i, i1, w˜)
or
Dd (¯i, i, w) 6= Dd (¯i, i1, w1)
and Xx (¯i, i1, w˜) = Xx (¯i, i2, w˜) .
Otherwise a watermarking scheme is called non-
blind (or non-oblivious or informed) if both of D (·)
and X (·) are dependent on i and/or w. Thus, for all
images i, i1 and watermarks w,w1, hold both
Dd (¯i, i, w) 6= Dd (¯i, i1, w1)
and Xx (¯i, i, w˜) 6= Xx (¯i, i1, w˜) .
We note here that strictly speaking the detection
function, D (·) and the extraction function X (·) must
have all three inputs: i¯, i, and w. However, for in-
stances of blind and semi-blind watermarking, some
inputs (e.g ., i and w) are not used in D (·) and X (·),
and thus they can be optionally omitted.
It can also be noted that the blindness property, as
defined in Definition 4.3 in terms of the watermark
detection and extraction functions, can also be con-
sidered for the watermark generation function. A non-
blind (i.e., an original image dependent) G (·) can be
helpful in resisting copy attacks (that aims at coun-
terfeiting the D (·) for any invalid modifications, or
invalid watermarked images; see Sec. 5.1.6 for the
definition of copy attack). The blindness for D (·) is
also important, where availability of the original im-
age, watermark or other side information at D (·) can
thwart watermarking objectives. Blind and non-blind
watermarking schemes are sometimes confused with
private and public watermarking respectively. How-
ever, we insist on defining a watermarking scheme to
be private and public in terms of their keys (as defined
in Sec. 3.2) to avoid any confusion.
4.4 Invertibility
Invertibility (or reversibility or losslessness) is a com-
putational property of watermarking. The meaning of
this property is quite intuitive; however, we expect
that defining invertibility in the current context would
help realize its mutual relation with other properties.
In an image application, invertibility is expected to
restore any watermarked images to their original ver-
sions, where no embedding distortion is allowed in the
original image. Such a watermarking criterion moti-
vates construction of an invertible E (·) that helpsD (·)
to reproduce an original image from the watermarked
image [30, 32, 34, 38, 39, 43–60]. Here, we define an
invertible watermarking scheme such that it allows in-
verse computation of E (·) during detection.
Definition 4.4 (Invertibility). A watermarking sch-
eme is invertible (or reversible or lossless) if the in-
verse of E (·) is computationally feasible to compute
and is used in D (·) to estimate an exact original im-
age, i, from the respective watermarked image, i¯. Oth-
erwise, the scheme is called non-invertible watermark-
ing scheme.
From the above definition, if Ee (i, w) = i¯, then for
an invertible watermarking scheme, E−1e the detection
must exist and satisfy E−1e (¯i) = (i, w). Therefore,
such watermarking schemes can be either blind or a
semi-blind (according to Definition 4.3). Since, in im-
age applications, an invertible watermarking scheme
is mainly designed to reverse the effect of embedding
on the original image, the embedding function is only
considered to define invertibility of the scheme. How-
ever, the concept of an invertible function can also be
extended for X (·), if an invertible G (·) is computa-
tionally feasible.
4.5 Robustness
Robustness in watermarking is often confused with
its meaning from cryptography [61]. A main reason
is probably that watermarking has to consider some
spatial or perceptual properties (e.g ., perceptual sim-
ilarity, visibility). Several attempts have been made
to informally define the robustness property of wa-
termarking. For example, Piper and Safavi-Naini [62]
considered a watermarking scheme as robust if it can
successfully detect the watermark in the “processed”
images. The strength of this definition depends on how
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the “processed” image is defined. In contrast, Cox et
al . [42] referred to robustness as the ability to de-
tect the watermark after common signal processing
techniques. More specifically, robustness can be de-
fined as the degree of resistance of a watermarking
scheme to modifications of the host signal due to ei-
ther common signal processing techniques or opera-
tions devised specifically in order to render the water-
mark undetectable [63]. In summary, watermarking ro-
bustness has to deal with: (i) defining a set of process-
ing techniques, and (ii) the detection ability for the
“processed” images.
We now formalize the concept of watermarking ro-
bustness in terms of the processed images and the
detection ability. Firstly, a set of processing techniques
(i.e., various operations/transforms) is defined below
to define a “processed” image for an application. Here,
the same set of processing techniques may not be valid
for different watermarking applications, and thus a
general consideration of the techniques may not be
always useful. Secondly, a detection condition is de-
fined that determines the detection ability, for the set
of “processed” images.
Definition 4.5 (Processed Image). A processed im-
age is an image that is not essentially perceptually sim-
ilar to its original, but a certain amount of distortion,
δ is incurred by a processing technique, p ∈ P . That is,
if any image, l ∈ I is processed by p then, for the pro-
cessed image, p (l) the following is true: p (l) = l + δ.
Here, P is the set of applicable processing techniques
for an application such that P ⊂ P, where P is the
space of processing techniques.
It is worth noting that, in our earlier work [2, 61],
we aimed at avoiding any confusion between the ro-
bustness and security properties, and considered that
a processed image is not perceptually similar to its un-
processed version. That consideration was based on the
assumption that only an adversary may want to pro-
cess a valid watermarked image to achieve the percep-
tual similarity requirements. However, that assump-
tion is not always valid in practice. For example, a
watermarked image can be processed such as by loss-
less compression and file-format conversion, with the
required perceptual similarity property (not only ma-
liciously, but also intentionally as a system require-
ment). We, therefore, revise our earlier consideration
for Def. 4.5 such that a processed image is not neces-
sarily perceptually similar to its unprocessed version.
We believe that this revision does not conflict with
our earlier intention to avoid the confusion between
robustness and security properties.
With the Def. 4.5, now we may wish to define the
detection condition for the robustness property. Sup-
pose a processing technique, p ∈ P , causes distor-
tion to a watermarked image, i¯. As defined in our
proposed model, Dd (·) accepts with the property:
Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) =
(˜
i, w˜
) ∪ ⊥ for all p (¯i) , i, w|p (¯i) ∈ I¯.
Here, the pass that returns with
(˜
i, w˜
)
and the failure,
⊥ can be used to define two potential variants, robust
and fragile respectively, of watermarking schemes for
different P . Another variant, semi-fragile watermark-
ing scheme can also be defined considering a suitable
subset of P . Thus, we define the robustness property in
Def. 4.6 considering detection ability at three different
levels.
Definition 4.6 (Robustness). A watermarking sch-
eme is defined for the following levels of robustness:
Robust. A watermarking scheme is called robust
if Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) =
(˜
i, w˜
)
for all p ∈ P .
Fragile. A watermarking scheme is called fragile
if Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) = ⊥ for all p ∈ P .
Semi-fragile. A watermarking scheme is called semi-
fragile if Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) =
(˜
i, w˜
)
for all
p ∈ P1 and Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) = ⊥ for all
p ∈ (P\P1), where P1 ⊂ P .
As stated in Def. 4.6, a successful detection (i.e.,
Dd (·) 6= ⊥) is the basic criterion for a watermarking
scheme to be robust to p ∈ P . However, there is no
absolute robustness for watermarking, since taking all
known/available processing techniques into consider-
ation (for robustness) is not realistic. It is therefore
reasonable to identify only the set of applicable pro-
cessing techniques for the robustness requirements in
an application (like knowing the set of potential adver-
saries for the security requirements in an application,
see Sec. 4.8 below). As Def. 4.6 suggests, we also stress
that one must have an explicit consideration on P for
design and evaluation of a watermarking scheme in a
particular application scenario.
When we consider P (the set of applicable process-
ing techniques), we may notice that different process-
ing techniques (e.g ., compression, de-noising) have dif-
ferent parameters (e.g ., compression ratio, down sam-
pling rate, type and rank of filter). These parameter
settings give different strengths to a processing tech-
nique. Therefore, it is worth noting that considering a
technique, p, means that p is defined with its all re-
quired parameter settings. The technique with other
settings thus remains outside of P .
4.6 Embedding Capacity
Embedding capacity (or simply capacity) is an impor-
tant, and maybe the most-studied, property for wa-
termarking schemes. A lot of studies have reported
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recently on improving this property maintaining the
required perceptual similarity in different ways [30,
32, 38, 39, 50–59]. A number of ways to estimate
the steganographic/watermarking embedding capacity
by using information theoretic and perceptual model
based methods, and detection theory are also present
in the literature [64–70]. Capacity estimation is a fun-
damental problem of steganography [69], where the
question is how much data can safely be hidden with-
out being detected? However, in watermarking, the
primary constraint for the capacity is its mutual de-
pendence on a few others properties (e.g ., perceptual
similarity, robustness) rather than the detection prob-
lem as in steganography. Therefore, we define water-
marking capacity on the basis of perceptual similarity
of (i, i¯), for which the scheme works objectively (e.g .,
without a failure).
Definition 4.7 (Embedding Capacity). Watermark-
ing embedding capacity for an image, i is the maxi-
mum size of any watermark, w = Gg (i,m, j) for all
m and j, to be embedded in i, such that Ee (i, w) ≈ i,
Dd (Ee (i, w) , i, w) =
(˜
i, w˜
)
, and there exists m˜, j˜|j˜ ≈
j such that Xx (Ee (i, w) , i, w˜) =
(
m˜, j˜
)
.
Def. 4.7 suggests that to know the capacity of a wa-
termarking scheme for an image, one needs to know
how many bits can be embedded in the image with
achieving the perceptual similarity and error proba-
bility (e.g ., successful detection) requirements. This
capacity estimation method may vary with the type
of watermarking schemes. Although several attempts
have already been made [64–70] to know the capac-
ity bound as mentioned above, developing a general
method for capacity estimation of each type of water-
marking schemes could still be interesting. This may
also help solve other capacity related problems like the
capacity control [50].
In image applications, embedding capacity is usu-
ally expressed as a ratio, bit-per-pixel (bpp). Accord-
ing to Def. 4.7, if the watermarking embedding capac-
ity is n-bit, and the size of watermark is m-bit (i.e.,
w = {1, 0}m), then the necessary condition for an in-
visible watermarking scheme is: m < n. This condition
suggests that there can be a hidden assumption of re-
cursive embedding in developing an invisible scheme—
if the required capacity is not achievable in first run
of E (·), the remaining bits can be re-embedded recur-
sively. That assumption may severely affect the per-
formance of a watermarking scheme in practice, and
thus needs to be explicitly stated, if applicable.
4.7 Error Probability
Error probability is an important property that helps
determine the reliability of a watermarking scheme in
practice. Some of the important and commonly used
measures of error probability are: bit error rate (BER),
false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR).
However, this property is often disregarded in develop-
ing a watermarking scheme, assuming a reliable (op-
erating) environment where communication errors are
“negligible” and can be managed, for example, by us-
ing a suitable error correction code. This assumption
is useful to simplify the application scenarios, but for
some applications (e.g ., proof of ownership), this prop-
erty needs to be studied explicitly. For example BER
can be considered to evaluate the performance of the
functions D (·) and X (·) in obtaining (˜i, w˜) and (m˜, j˜)
respectively. (Here, BER follows its standard definition
in communication system.) In our proposed model, we
defined D (·) in such a way that the absence of a valid
watermark, w in a watermarked image, i¯ outputs a
detection failure. Otherwise,D (·) returns (˜i, w˜), which
indicates that the input image is watermarked. Follow-
ing this, we define the false positive and false negative
for our model below.
Definition 4.8 (False Positive and False Negative). A
watermarking detection in a normal condition is said
to be a false positive if Dd (i, w) 6= ⊥ for some i. Con-
versely, a watermarking detection is a false negative if
Dd (¯i, i, w) = ⊥ for some i¯. Here, the normal condition
allows the scheme to run with all of its valid inputs,
outputs, and functions.
Irrespective of application scenarios, ideally, a zero
FNR and FPR represents a reliable detection. Particu-
larly, a watermarking scheme can be of no use if a sch-
eme is unable to detect a valid watermark in normal
condition of operation. Achieving a zero FNR and FPR
in practice, however, may not be realistic for many
reasons like communication errors. So, it is reasonable
here to define a highly accurate detection for an appli-
cation scenario in terms of a very low probability (e.g .,
in the order of 10−6) of detection failure.
However, error probability may be confused with
other watermarking properties. Other properties (e.g .,
security, robustness, perceptual similarity) may also
deal with errors, which can be of different types; for
example, bit-errors (often termed as distortion) in a
valid watermarked/unwatermarked image, which can
be incurred maliciously, unintentionally, or as a sys-
tem requirement, may also cause a detection failure.
Further, we note that the function E (·) itself utilize
the error signal, e.g ., exploiting the redundant bit-
planes of an image, for embedding. This embedding
error can be considered as a system requirement and
thus can be addressed in terms of perceptual similarity
requirement. Specifically, while error probability mea-
sures can be used to determine the system error rate
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for the reliability of a watermarking scheme, the other
perceptual errors (i.e., distortion) can be studied in
terms of the security, robustness and perceptual simi-
larity properties.
4.8 Security
Security property of watermarking schemes as a whole
may be far from easy to conceptualize (and may not be
always necessary in practice) [71–73]. Two main possi-
ble reasons are: (i) application dependent properties,
and (ii) the confusion between security and robustness
requirements. In practice, different image applications
may require different levels of security. Some applica-
tions do not need to be secure at all since there is
no ultimate benefit in circumvention of watermarking
objectives. For example, where a watermark is used
only to add value in which they are embedded rather
than to restrict uses for some device control applica-
tions [42]. Therefore, these types of watermarks do not
need to be secure against any hostile attacks, although
they still need to be robust against common processing
techniques used in those applications. (This is how we
defined the robustness property in Def. 4.6.)
Although the requirements for robustness and secu-
rity properties of a watermarking scheme may over-
lap [61], they need to be considered separately. For
security properties, in contrast to robustness, all pos-
sible attacks that an adversary may attempt within a
particular scenario are to be studied. This may include
different attacks; namely, elimination attack, collusion
attack, masking attack, distortion attack, forgery at-
tack, copy attack, ambiguity attack, scrambling at-
tack, and/or other form of active and passive attacks
in an application scenario. We will discuss and for-
mally define these attacks in Sec. 5; however, to define
a secure watermarking scheme formally, we denote an
attack (i.e., a set of adversary actions) in an applica-
tion scenario by A . Therefore, as discussed above, the
possible choices for the attack A may vary with an
application scenario.
Definition 4.9 (Security). A watermarking scheme
is called A –secure if the scheme retains the security
against the attack A (i.e., if it is “hard” to succeed
with the set of adversary actions mounted by the attack
A ).
An application-specific analytical approach is often
considered to study watermarking security [3, 16, 74–
80]. In a broad sense, this practice suggests that the
security property can be studied for two main types
of watermarking schemes: robust and fragile. However,
instead of focusing on a specific type of watermarking
schemes, in this paper (Sec. 5), we are more interested
in studying the general scenarios of a set of possible
attacks in an abstract level for image applications. The
main idea is to demonstrate how an adversary of differ-
ent capabilities may win with different conditions. We
call this a win condition. Knowing the inputs, outputs,
and the win-conditions would eventually help visual-
ize the possible attacks in an application. (With that
visualization, conducting an application-specific secu-
rity analysis can be easier and more efficient). Here, we
consider that identifying the set of attacks in a specific
application and defining them in the model are the first
steps to defining the watermarking security.
5 Attacks on the Watermarking Security
In the watermarking context, an attack can be roughly
defined as any malicious attempt to perform unautho-
rized embedding, removal, or detection of a (valid or
invalid) watermark. An adversary that makes such at-
tempts can be of different capabilities (e.g ., can have
different inputs, and access to the watermarking func-
tions). In practice, it is quite reasonable to assume
the capabilities of expected adversaries in modelling
attacks. For example, an adversary knowing nothing
may assume an image is watermarked and may want
to remove the watermark by applying a distortion at-
tack (see Def. 5.4). Having access to the embedding
function, an adversary can also find and exploit the
weakness of the detection function in applying differ-
ent active attacks including elimination and masking
attacks, (see Def. 5.1 and Def. 5.3, respectively). Fur-
ther, more difficult security problems arise if the ad-
versary has both embedding and detection functions
and knows how they work.
Attacks on the watermarking security can be mainly
divided in two categories [42]: (i) active (i.e., unau-
thorized embedding and unauthorized removal) and
(ii) passive (i.e., unauthorized detection). An active
attack attempts to alter the watermarking resources
or to affect their operation, whereas a passive attack,
without doing that, attempts to know or exploit wa-
termarking information. Some active attacks that cir-
cumvent the scheme directly are often referred to as
system or protocol attacks. We define different attacks
below using our model. Depending on which inputs are
available to the adversary, however, there may be dif-
ferent flavours of the definitions. In what follows, the
original (valid) watermark is defined as w0 ∈W to dis-
tinguish it from other modified versions in an attack.
Any other new notations will be defined accordingly.
5.1 Active Attacks
5.1.1 Elimination Attack
In an elimination attack, an adversary tries to out-
put an image, which is perceptually similar to the wa-
termarked image and not be detected as containing
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the watermark. Thus, the attacked watermarked im-
age cannot be considered to contain a watermark at
all. It is important to consider that eliminating the
watermark does not necessarily mean reconstructing
(or inverting) the watermarked image [42]. Rather, the
adversary may output a new image that is perceptu-
ally similar to the watermarked image.
Definition 5.1 (Elimination Attack).
Input. Watermarked image,
i = Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈W
Output. Attacked image, ia ∈ I˜ such that
ia ≈ i¯
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w) = ⊥ for all w
Here, for a stronger adversary, the input can also
include w0 and the adversary can have access to Ee (·).
5.1.2 Collusion Attack
In a collusion attack, an adversary obtains several wa-
termarked versions of an original image, each with a
different or same watermark to obtain a close approx-
imation of the watermarked image and thereby, pro-
duces a copy with no watermark.
Definition 5.2 (Collusion Attack).
Input. n copies (where n ≥ 2) of wa-
termarked image, i¯j = Ee (i, wj),
where j = {1, · · · , n}
Output. ia ∈ I˜ such that ia ≈ i¯j
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w) = ⊥ for all w
As in Def. 5.2, for example, an adversary has n copies
(where n ≥ 2) of watermarked image, i¯j = Ee (i, wj),
where j = {1, · · · , n}. In the form of an elimination
attack, the adversary outputs ia ∈ I˜ such that ia ≈ i¯j ,
and wins if for all w, Dd (ia, i, w) = ⊥.
5.1.3 Masking Attack
Masking of a watermark means that the attacked wa-
termarked image can still have the watermark, which
is, however, undetectable by existing detectors. More
sophisticated detectors might be able to detect it.
Let an adversary have a watermarked image, i¯ =
Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈W . Here, the adversary aims to
output ia ∈ I¯ such that ia ≈ i¯. The adversary wins if
Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such that
Dd (ia, i, w) 6= ⊥, as defined in Def. 5.3.
Definition 5.3 (Masking Attack).
Input. A watermarked image, i¯ =
Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈W
Output. ia ∈ I¯ such that ia ≈ i¯
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥, but there exists
w 6= w0 such that Dd (ia, i, w) 6=
⊥
5.1.4 Distortion Attack
In some masking attacks, an adversary applies some
processing techniques uniformly over the watermarked
image or some part of it, in order to degrade the water-
mark, so that the embedded watermark becomes un-
detectable or unreadable. This sub-class of masking
attack has special merit in image processing and is re-
ferred to as distortion attack. De-noising attacks and
synchronization attacks are two common attacks in
this category.
Given a watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), an adver-
sary applies a processing technique, q ∈ Q uniformly
over the whole i¯, or selected object/region of i¯, and
outputs q (¯i). According to Def. 5.4, the adversary wins
if Dd (q (¯i) , i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such
that Dd (q (¯i) , i, w) 6= ⊥. Q is the set of applicable
processing techniques such that Q ⊂ P.
Definition 5.4 (Distortion Attack).
Input. A watermarked image, i¯ =
Ee (i, w0), and a processing tech-
nique, q (·) ∈ Q. where Q is the
set of applicable processing tech-
niques such that Q ⊂ P
Output. A processed image, q (¯i)
Win Condition. Dd (q (¯i) , i, w0) = ⊥ but there
exists w 6= w0 such that
Dd (q (¯i) , i, w) 6= ⊥
5.1.5 Forgery Attack
In a forgery attack, an adversary outputs an invalid
watermarked image in the form of unauthorized em-
bedding. An adversary with the ability to perform
unauthorized embedding can be presumed able to
cause the detector to falsely authenticate an invalid
watermarked image.
Given access to Ee (·), an adversary chooses a new
unwatermarked image, ia ∈ I and a new watermark,
wa ∈W to output the watermarked image, i¯a ∈ I¯. As
in Def. 5.5, the adversary wins with the output (i¯a, ia)
if there exists wa ∈ W such that Dd (i¯a, ia, wa) 6= ⊥,
and also, possibly, there exists w˜a ∈ W˜ such that
Xx (i¯a, ia, w˜a) 6= ⊥.
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Definition 5.5 (Forgery Attack).
Input. A new unwatermarked image,
ia ∈ I, a new watermark, wa ∈
W , and the access to Ee (·)
Output. A new watermarked image, i¯a
Win Condition. There exists wa ∈ W such that
Dd (i¯a, ia, wa) 6= ⊥
This attack is accomplished in two parts. During the
first part, the adversary has access to Ee (·). In the
second part, the adversary has to output a forgery,
which is different from all the outputs from Ee (·) in the
first part. A stronger adversary may also have access
to Gg (·) to obtain wa (and possibly, choose m and
j), and thus to output i¯a = Ee (ia, Gg (ia,m, j)) that
makes the adversary more likely to win, specially over
Xx (·).
5.1.6 Copy Attack
In a copy attack, an adversary outputs an invalid wa-
termarked image as in a forgery attack. However, the
adversary copies a watermark from one valid water-
marked image into another to falsely authenticate an
invalid watermarked image. In principle, an adversary
initially tries to estimate the unwatermarked image
from its watermarked version and then estimates the
original watermark from the estimated unwatermarked
image and the original watermarked image. Finally,
the estimated watermark is embedded to a new unwa-
termarked image to get a forged watermarked copy.
Suppose an adversary is given a valid watermarked
image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0) and the access to Ee (·). The
adversary obtains the estimated original watermark,
w˜0, and chooses an unwatermarked image, ia to out-
put a new watermarked image, i¯a = Ee (ia, w˜0). Fi-
nally, as given in Def. 5.6, the adversary wins with
output (i¯a, ia) if there exists w˜0 ∈ W such that
Dd (i¯a, ia, w˜0) 6= ⊥. Also possibly, there exists ˜˜w0 ∈ W˜
such that Xx
(
i¯a, ia, ˜˜w0
) 6= ⊥, where ˜˜w0 is the estimate
of w˜0.
Definition 5.6 (Copy Attack).
Input. A valid watermarked image, i¯ =
Ee (i, w0), a new unwatermarked
image, ia ∈ I, and the access to
Ee (·)
Output. A new watermarked image, i¯a =
Ee (ia, w˜0)
Win Condition. There exists w˜0 ∈ W such that
Dd (i¯a, ia, w˜0) 6= ⊥, where ˜˜w0 is
the estimate of w˜0
An adversary can win with the copy attack if the
original watermark, w0 is independent of the image, i
such that w0 = Gg (m, j). In addition, obtaining w˜0
from i˜ and i¯ can be easier for the adversary if the
watermark embedding is simply additive. such that,
w˜0 ∼=
∣∣¯i− i˜∣∣. Thus, without having an access to Gg (·),
the adversary can find w˜0 and output a forged water-
marked image, i¯a.
5.1.7 Ambiguity Attack
In a successful ambiguity attack, an adversary outputs
a forgery, where a valid watermarked image is forged
(i.e., illegally watermarked) with a chosen watermark.
The output forgery later can be verified as valid for the
chosen (not for the originally embedded) watermark.
Therefore, unlike a copy or forgery attack, it has a
direct impact on the scheme.
Suppose a valid watermarked image, i¯ and access to
Ee (·) are given to an adversary. An ambiguity attack
outputs a new watermarked image, i¯a = Ee (¯i, wa) and
the adversary wins if there exists wa ∈ W such that
Dd (i¯a, i¯, wa) 6= ⊥ (Def. 5.7). Also possibly, there exists
(w˜a) ∈ W˜ such that Xx (i¯a, i¯, w˜a) 6= ⊥. Similar to
forgery attack, a stronger adversary may have access
to Gg (·) to obtain wa = Gg (i,m, j) |i = i¯.
Definition 5.7 (Ambiguity Attack).
Input. Valid watermarked image, i¯ and
the access to Ee (·)
Output. A new watermarked image, i¯a =
Ee (¯i, wa)
Win Condition. There exists wa ∈ W such that
Dd (i¯a, i¯, wa) 6= ⊥
5.1.8 Scrambling Attack
The objective of an adversary in applying a scram-
bling attack is similar to that of masking attack (i.e.,
to falsify the detection of a valid watermarked image).
However, in this attack, the samples of a watermarked
image are scrambled prior to being presenting to the
detector and subsequently descrambled. The type of
scrambling can be a simple sample permutation or a
more sophisticated pseudo-random scrambling [42]. A
well-known scrambling attack is the mosaic attack, in
which an image is broken into many small rectangular
patches, each too small for reliable watermark detec-
tion. These image segments are then displayed in a
table such that the segment edges are adjacent. The
resulting table of small images is perceptually identical
to the image prior to subdivision.
Definition 5.8 (Scrambling Attack).
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Input. A watermarked image, i¯ =
Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈ W , and
the access to ‘suitable’ scrambling
and descrambling functions
Output. An image, i¯a ∈ I¯ from scram-
bling the samples of i¯ ∈ I¯ (before
detection, and descrambles back
to i¯ ∈ I¯ after detection)
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists
w 6= w0 such that Dd (ia, i, w) 6=
⊥
Given input to an adversary includes a watermarked
image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈ W . The adver-
sary outputs an image, i¯a ∈ I¯ from scrambling the
samples of i¯ ∈ I¯ before detection, and descrambles
back to i¯ after detection such that ia ≈ i¯. The adver-
sary wins with a suitable scrambler and descrambler,
if Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such that
Dd (ia, i, w) 6= ⊥, as in Def. 5.8.
5.2 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks can have different objectives such as
detecting the presence of a valid watermark or know-
ing the associated information being carried by it. As
mentioned in the beginning of this section, unlike ac-
tive attacks, passive attacks do not attempt to alter
the watermarking resources. However, a passive attack
aims at knowing or exploiting the watermarking infor-
mation and can have different level of consequences
depending upon what it tries to achieve. We, there-
fore, define three different levels for the passive attacks
considering their different objectives. We name these
levels (to classify the passive attacks in each level) as
comprehensive detection attack, incisive detection at-
tack, and detection only attack.
In a comprehensive detection attack, an adversary
wins by achieving all the three levels of target given in
Def. 5.9. Similarly, to win an incisive detection attack,
an adversary achieves the first two levels of target but
fails to achieve target level 3. In the basic form of pas-
sive attack, a detection only attack, an adversary wins
only with the target level 1.
Definition 5.9 (Passive Attacks).
Level 1. (Detection only). An adversary only de-
tects the presence of valid watermark, w ∈
W in a watermarked image, i¯ ∈ I¯.
Level 2. (Incisive detection). An adversary distin-
guishes the watermark, w ∈ W from that
of other watermarked image(s), l¯ ∈ I¯|l¯ 6=
i¯.
Level 3. (Comprehensive detection). An adver-
sary obtains information at least partially
(e.g ., the message, m ∈M and other im-
age data, j ∈ J etc.) that the valid water-
mark, w ∈ W carries, without modifying
the watermarked image, i¯ ∈ I¯.
6 Conclusions
The study of digital watermarking is by no means
new [81, 82]. Although it has received tremendous
attention in different applications, formal concept in
their systematic developments are yet to be estab-
lished. Addressing the gap, in this paper, we have pre-
sented our work in three main parts: (i) a formal
watermarking model (Sec. 3), (ii) definitions and uses
of fundamental properties (Sec. 4), and (iii) possible
attacks on the watermarking security (Sec. 5).
We have presented a formal generic watermarking
model for digital image applications. Due to the high
application variant properties of watermarking, we
have focused on the image applications. We believe
that our models can usefully be extended to other ap-
plications later. We determined a set of possible inputs,
outputs, and component functions by studying the wa-
termarking schemes proposed for different image appli-
cations. Thereby, we have initially constructed a basic
watermarking model and later extended the model to a
key-based model for completeness. Using the proposed
model with suitable inputs, outputs, and functional
properties, all possible variants of digital image water-
marking schemes can be characterized and described
(for example, to carry out the necessary computational
analyses).
In addition, we have highlighted and defined a set
of properties of watermarking with their practical in-
terpretation in different image applications. Particu-
larly, we defined the robustness and security prop-
erties of watermarking using the sets of (signal and
image based) processing techniques and possible at-
tacks, respectively. Although robustness can be inter-
preted as a security property, we believe our definition
helps avoid any potential confusion between them in
the signal and image processing contexts. Some other
properties, such as computational complexity and cost,
are important; however, in this paper, we have consid-
ered mainly those properties which can have varying
interpretation with the application. Thus, addressing
some hidden assumptions and associated confusions,
we have presented the necessary corrections and clar-
ifications with examples.
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We have also defined a set of possible attacks with
their win conditions using our model. Knowing the in-
puts, outputs, and win conditions helps one to visual-
ize the necessary models of possible attacks, and thus
helps conduct an application-specific security analy-
sis more efficiently. Depending upon the application
scenario and available data (e.g ., watermarked image,
watermark) and tools (e.g ., embedding function), they
can be defined for a stronger or weaker adversary. How-
ever, we mainly focused on a weaker adversary (as a
notion of stronger security requirements) by classify-
ing them into two categories: active and passive. Some
active attacks, known as system attacks, aim at the
protocols of the schemes. Two prominent system at-
tacks, ambiguity and scrambling attacks, in addition
to the common active attacks, are also defined. For
passive attacks, we have defined three different levels
(i.e., detection only, incisive detection, and compre-
hensive detection attacks) to define the win conditions
for an adversary. With all these attack definitions, we
have shown how an adversary of different capabilities
may win with different conditions.
As a final remark, we believe that the contributions
presented in this paper are a first step towards a uni-
fied and intuitive theory for digital image watermark-
ing. We also believe that the proposed model allows a
unified treatment of all practically meaningful variants
of digital image watermarking. Further, our considera-
tions, definitions, and discussions on the fundamental
defining properties and attacks can help to understand
them while avoiding some potential confusions and
taking a step forward towards the systematic devel-
opment of watermarking schemes. We have supported
our thesis with meaningful examples, necessary expla-
nations, and comparative studies. The following, how-
ever, could be interesting topics for future research:
(i) further development and a quantitative analysis of
the proposed model; (ii) developing complete attack
models (using the proposed model) and (iii) defining
security levels (in terms of possible attacks), for differ-
ent image (and other media such as audio and video)
applications.
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